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The role played by counterexamples in standard system analysis is well known; but less common
is a notion of counterexample in probabilistic systems refinement. In this paper we extend previous
work using counterexamples to inductive invariant properties of probabilistic systems, demonstrating
how they can be used to extend the technique of bounded model checking-style analysis for the re-
finement of quantitative safety specifications in the probabilistic B language. In particular, we show
how the method can be adapted to cope with refinements incorporating probabilistic loops. Finally,
we demonstrate the technique on pB models summarising a one-step refinement of a randomised
algorithm for finding the minimum cut of undirected graphs, and that for the dependability analysis
of a controller design.
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1 Introduction
The B method [1] and more recently its successor Event-B [2] comprises a method and its automation
for modelling complex software systems. It is based on the top-down refinement where specifications
can be elaborated with detail and additional features, whilst the automated prover checks consistency
between the refinements. Hoang’s probabilistic B or pB [15] extension of standard B gave designers the
ability to refer to probability and access to the specification of quantitative safety properties.
In probabilistic systems, the generalisation of traditional safety properties allows the specification of
random variables whose expected value must always remain above some given threshold. Elsewhere
[23, 25] we have provided automation to check this requirement by analysing pB models using an
automatic translation of their quantitative safety specifications as PRISM reward structures [14]. Our
technique allows pB modellers to explore the quantitative safety properties encoded within their models
to obtain diagnostic feedback in the form of counterexample traces in the case that their model does
not satisfy the quantitative specification. Counterexamples become sets of execution traces each with
some probability of occurring and jointly implying that the specified threshold is not maintained. More-
over pB’s consistency checking enforces inductive invariance of the quantitative safety property, thus
the counterexample traces also demonstrate specific points in the models execution where the inductive
property fails.
The paradigm of abstraction and refinement supports stepwise development of probabilistic systems
aimed at improving probabilistic results. Unfortunately, for quantitative safety specifications (our focus
here), a human verifier has no way of inspecting that this requirement is met even though the automated
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prover readily establishes consistency between the refinements. One way to resolve this uncertainty is
to explore algorithmic approaches similar to probabilistic model checking techniques which can provide
exact diagnostics summarising the failure (if indeed it exists) of the refinement goal.
In this paper we extend some practical uses of counterexamples to probabilistic systems refinement
with respect to quantitative safety specifications particular to the pB language. We show how to use them
to generalise bounded model checking-style analysis for probabilistic programs so that an iteration can
be verified by exhaustive search provided that quantitative invariants are inductive for all reachable states.
We also show how the use of probabilistic counterexamples in quantitative dependability analysis can
be used to determine “failure modes” and “critical sets” which thus enables their extension to estimating
components severity.
We illustrate the techniques on two case studies: one based on a probabilistic algorithm [20] to find
the minimum cut set in a graph, and the other a probabilistic design for a controller mechanism [11].
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec.2 we summarise the underlying theory of pB; in
Sec.3 we discuss the probabilistic counterexamples we can derive from the models and a bounded model
checking approach to probabilistic iteration. In Sec.5 we illustrate the technique on the specification of
a randomised “min-cut”. We discuss probabilistic diagnostics of dependability in Sec.6 and demonstrate
with a case study in Sec.7. We discuss related work and then conclude.
1.0.1 Notation
Function application is represented by a dot, as in f .x (rather than f (x)). We use an abstract finite state
space S. Given predicate pred we write liftpred for the characteristic function mapping states satisfying
pred to 1 and to 0 otherwise, punning 1 and 0 with “True” and “False” respectively. We write E S as the
set of real-valued functions from S, i.e. the set of expectations; and whenever e,e′ ∈ E S we write e⇛ e′
to mean that (∀s ∈ S. e.s ≤ e′.s). We let DS be the set of all discrete probability distributions over S; and
write Exp.δ .e = ∑
s∈S
(δ .s)× e.s for the expected value of e over S where δ ∈ DS and e ∈ E S. Finally we
write S∗ for the finite sequences of states in S.
2 Probabilistic annotations
When probabilistic programs execute they make random updates; in the semantics that behaviour is
modelled by discrete probability distributions over possible final values of the program variables. Given
a program Prog operating over S we write [[Prog]] : S → (S → [0,1]) for the semantic function taking
initial states to distributions over final states. For example, the program fragment
pInc , s:=s+1 p⊕ s:=s−1 (1)
increments state variable s with probability p, or decrements it with probability 1−p. The semantics
[[pInc]] for each initial state s is a probability distribution returning p or (1−p) for (final) states s′ = (s+1)
or s′ = (s−1) respectively. Rather than working with this semantics directly, we shall focus on the dual
logical view generalisation of Hoare logic [16].
Probabilistic Hoare logic [22] takes account of the probabilistic judgements that can be made about
probabilistic programs, in particular it can express when predicates can be established only with some
probability. However, as we shall see, it is even more general than that, capable of expressing general
expected properties of random variables over the program state. We use Real-valued annotations of the
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Name Prog Wp.Prog.Expt
identity skip Expt
assignment x := f Expt[x := f ]
composition Prog;Prog′ Wp.Prog.(wp ·Prog′ ·Expt)
choice Prog⊳ G ⊲ Prog′ Wp.Prog.Expt⊳ G ⊲Wp.Prog′.Expt
probability Prog p⊕ Prog′ Wp.Prog.Expt p⊕ Wp.Prog′.Expt
nondeterminism Prog ⊓ Prog′ Wp.Prog.Expt min Wp.Prog′.Expt
weak iteration it Prog ti νX • (Wp.Prog.X min Expt)
Given a program command Prog and expectation Expt of type E S, Wp.Prog is of type E S → E S. Note also that we write
Exp.([[Prog]].s).Expt to mean Wp.Prog.Expt.s.
Figure 1: Structural definition of the expectation transformer-style semantics.
program variables interpreted as expectations; a program annotation is said to be valid exactly when the
expected value over the post-annotation is at least the value given by the pre-annotation. In detail
{pre} Prog {post} , (2)
is valid exactly when Exp.[[Prog]].post.s≥ pre.s for all states s ∈ S, where post is interpreted as a random
variable over final states and pre as a real-valued function.
With our notational convention, a correct annotation for pInc (at (1)) is given by the triple
{p× lift(s =−1)+ (1−p)× lift(s = 1)} pInc {lift(s = 0)} , (3)
which expresses the probability of establishing the state s = 0 finally, depending on the initial state from
which pInc executes. Thus if the initial state is s = −1 then that probability is p, but it is (1−p) if the
initial state is s = 1.
Rather than use the distribution-centered semantics outlined above, we shall use a generalisation
of Dijkstra’s weakest precondition or Wp semantics defined on the program syntax of the probabilistic
Guarded Command Language or pGCL [22]. The semantics of the language is set out in Fig. 1. As for
standard Wp this formulation allows annotations to be checked mechanically [15, 17]; moreover we see
that annotation (2) is valid exactly when pre⇛Wp.Prog.post.
In this paper we shall concentrate on certifying probabilistic safety expressible using probabilistic
annotations. Informally, a probabilistic safety property is a random variable whose expected value cannot
be decreased on execution of the program. (This idea generalises standard safety, where the truth of a
safety predicate cannot be violated on execution of the program.) Safety properties are characterised by
inductive invariants: for example the valid annotation {Expt×liftpred} Prog {Expt} says that Expt is an
inductive invariant for Prog provided it is executed in an initial state satisfying pred. To illustrate, the
annotation
{s} pInc {s} , (4)
means that the expected value of s is never decreased (and it is therefore only valid if p≥ 1/2).
Inductive invariants will be a significant component of the refinement of quantitative safety specifi-
cations in our pB machines, to which we now turn.
104 Model exploration and analysis for quantitative safety refinement in probabilistic B
MACHINE Faulty
SEES Int TYPE, Real TYPE
CONSTANTS p
PROPERTIES p ∈ REAL∧ p≥ real(0)∧ p ≤ real(1)
VARIABLES cc
INVARIANT cc ∈ N
INITIALISATION cc := 0
OPERATIONS
OpX , BEGIN
PCHOICE p OF cc := cc+1
OR cc := cc−1 END;
OpY , cc := 0
EXPECTATIONS real(0) ⇛ cc
END
Bold texts on the left column capture the fields (or clauses) used to describe the machine. The PCHOICE keyword introduces
a probabilistic binary operator; the EXPECTATIONS clause expresses the notion of probabilistic quantitative safety.
Figure 2: A simple pB machine.
2.1 Probabilistic safety and refinement in pB
Probabilistic B or pB [15], is an extension of standard B [1] to support the specification and refinement of
probabilistic systems. Systems are specified by a collection of pB machines which consist of operations
describing possible program executions, together with variable declarations and invariants prescribing
correct behaviour.
The machine set out in Fig. 2 illustrates some key features of the language. There are two operations
–OpX and OpY– which can update a variable cc. OpX can either increment cc by 1 or decrement it by the
same value with probability p or (1− p) respectively, while OpY just resets the current value of cc to 0.
In general, operations can execute only if their preconditions hold. But in the absence of preconditions
as in this case, the choice of which operation to execute is made nondeterministically.
The remaining clauses ascribe more information to the variables, constants and behaviour of the
operations. Declarations are made in the CONSTANTS and VARIABLES clauses; PROPERTIES and
SEES clauses state assumed properties and context of the constants and variables. The INVARIANT
clause sets out invariant properties. The expression in the INITIALISATION clause must establish the
invariant and the operations OpX and OpY must maintain it afterwards.
We shall concentrate on the EXPECTATIONS clause1, which was introduced by Hoang [15] to
express quantitative invariant or safety properties. The form of an EXPECTATIONS clause is given by
E ⇛ Expt , (5)
where both E and Expt are expectations. It specifies that the expected value of Expt should always be at
least E , where the expected value is determined by the distribution over the state space after any valid
execution of the machine’s operations, following its initialisation. Hoang showed that this is guaranteed
by the following valid annotations:
1However, Hoang [15] showed that another way to check that a real-value Ω is indeed an expectation is to evaluate the
language-specific boolean function expectation(Ω). Therefore we shall interchangeably use both forms to denote expectations-
based expressions with no loss of generality.
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{E} init {Expt} and {liftpred×Expt} Op {Expt} , (6)
where Op is any operation with precondition pred and init is the machine’s initialisation. In what follows
we shall refer to (6) as the proof obligations for the associated expectations clause (5).
Checking the validity of program annotation, and in particular inductive invariants for loop-free
program fragments can be done mechanically based on the semantics set out in Fig. 1. In some cases the
proof obligation cannot be discharged, and there are two possible reasons for this. The first possibility is
that Expt is too weak to be an inductive invariant for the machine’s operations, and must be strengthened
by finding Expt′⇛ Expt so that the original safety property can be validated. The second possibility is
that the machine’s operations actually violate the probabilistic safety property.
The same reasoning can be extended to refinement of abstract pB machines. We note that quantitative
safety specifications in pB can also be refined in the usual way with respect to expectation pairs. Thus
another way of expressing (5) is to say that any program command P satisfies the bounded expectation
pair [E,Expt] if execution from its initial state guarantees that
E ⇛Wp.P.Expt. (7)
Refinement is then implied by the ordering of program commands so that more refined programs improve
probabilistic results. More specifically, we write
P ⊑ Q iff (∀E ∈ E S·Wp.P.E ⇛Wp.Q.E), (8)
to mean that the program command Q is a refinement of the program command P. In addition we note
that the preservation of an expression like (5) is implied by the monotone property of Wp.
The refinement of abstract pB machines embedding quantitative safety statements is dealt with in the
language framework by introducing the IMPLEMENTATION and REFINES clauses. The former clause
specifies the refinement of an abstract machine specified in the latter clause. The refinement process is
then aimed at preserving the bounds of expectations in the original specification statement (the machine
to be refined) so that the validity of an expression like (6) can be checked mechanically.
Our aim in the next section is to use probabilistic counterexamples adopted in model checking tech-
niques to interpret failure of proofs of refinement of probabilistic machines in the pB language. We
will find that a counterexample is a trace (or a set of traces) from the initialisation to a state where the
inductive invariant fails to hold after inspecting the EXPECTATIONS clause over the refinement.
3 Probabilistic safety in Markov Decision Processes
In abstract terms pGCL programs and pB machines may be modelled as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP). Recall that an MDP combines the notion of probabilistic updates together with some arbitrary
choice between those updates [27]: that combination of probabilistic choices together with nondetermin-
istic choices is present in pGCL and captures both features.
In this section we summarise pB models2 and their quantitative safety specifications in terms of
MDPs, and show how to apply model checking’s search techniques for counterexamples to prove quanti-
tative safety as a first step towards generalising standard bounded model checking verification. Inductive
invariance is then crucial to the application of exhaustive state exploration for the intended goal.
2We note that an abstract pB model begins with the MACHINE keyword while a refinement is a pB model that begins with
the IMPLEMENTATION keyword.
106 Model exploration and analysis for quantitative safety refinement in probabilistic B
Here we consider an MDP expressed as a nondeterministic selection P , P0 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pn of deter-
ministic pGCL programs, where the nondeterminism corresponds to the arbitrary choice, and each Pi
corresponds to the probabilistic update for a choice i. When P is iterated for some arbitrarily-many
steps, we identify a computation path as a finite sequence of states 〈s0,s1,s2, . . . ,sn〉 where each (si,si+1)
is a probabilistic transition of P, i.e. si+1 can occur with non-zero probability by executing P from si.
Note that the choice (between 0 . . .n) can depend on the previous computation path since for example
guards for the individual operations Pi must hold for their selection to be enabled.
Standard safety properties identify a set of “safe” states — the safety property then holds provided
that all states reachable from the initial state under specified state transitions are amongst the selected
safe states. A generalisation of this for probabilistic systems specifies thresholds on the probability
for which the reachable states are always amongst the safe states. The quantitative safety properties
encapsulated by the EXPECTATIONS clause are even more general than that, allowing the possibility to
specify thresholds on arbitrary expected properties. The next definition sets out the mathematical model
for interpreting general quantitative safety properties.
Since MDPs contain both nondeterministic and probabilistic choice, taking expected values only
makes sense over well-defined probability distributions — we need to resolve the nondeterministic choice
in all possible ways to yield a set of probability distributions. The next definition sets out a mechanism
for doing just that.
Definition 1 Given a program P, an execution schedule is a map ℵ : S∗→DS so that ℵ.α ∈ [[P]].s picks
a particular resolution of the nondeterminism in P to execute after the trace α , where s is the last item
of α . (A more uniform formalisation would give the distribution of initial states as ℵ.〈〉; but we prefer
to give initial states explicitly.)
Once a particular schedule has been selected, the resulting behaviour generates a probability distribution
over computation path. We call such a distribution a probabilistic computation tree; such distributions
are well-defined with respect to Borel algebras based on the traces.
Definition 2 Given a program P, initial state s0 and execution schedule ℵ, we define the corresponding
trace distribution 〈|Pℵ|〉.s0 of type S∗→ [0,1] to be
〈|Pℵ|〉.s0.(s′) , 1 if s′ = s0 else 0
and 〈|Pℵ|〉.s0.(αss′) , 〈|Pℵ|〉.s0.(αs)×ℵ.(αs).s′
Computation trees of finite depth generate a distribution over endpoints as follows. If we take K steps
from some initial s0 according to the schedule ℵ, then the probability of ending in state s′ is given by
[[PKℵ ]].s0.s
′ , ∑
|α |=K
〈|Pℵ|〉.s0.(αs′) .
General quantitative safety properties are intuitively specified via a numeric threshold e and a random
variable Expt over the state space S: the expected value of Expt with respect to any distribution over
endpoints should never fall below the threshold e.
Definition 3 Given threshold e and an expectation Expt the general quantitative safety property is satis-
fied by the program P if for all schedules ℵ and K ≥ 0, we have that Exp.[[PKℵ ]].Expt.s0 ≥ e.
The probabilistic Computation Tree Logic or pCTL [13] safety property, which places a threshold
on the probability that the reachable states always satisfy the identified “safe” states is expressible using
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Def. 3 via characteristic expectation liftsa f e. However many more general properties are also express-
ible, including expected time complexity [14].
We shall be interested in identifying situations where the inequality in Def. 3 does not hold. Evidence
for the failure is a (finite) computation tree whose distribution over endpoints illustrates the failure to
meet the threshold.
Definition 4 Given a probabilistic safety property, a failure tree is defined by a scheduler ℵ and an
integer K ≥ 0 such that Exp.[[PKℵ ]].Expt.s0 < e.
Elsewhere [24] we showed that if Expt is an inductive invariant, then the safety property based on
Expt is implied, provided that e ≤ Expt.s0. In fact, given a failure tree, there must be some finite trace
α such that 〈|Pℵ|〉.s0.(αs) > 0 and Wp.(P ⊓ skip).Expt.s < Expt.s [24]. Thus, as for standard model
checking, we are able to locate specific traces which lead to the failure of the invariant property. We
define a counterexample to inductive invariance as follows.
Definition 5 Given a scheduler ℵ, an expectation Expt and a program P, a counterexample to inductive
invariance safety property is a trace (αs) which can occur with non-zero probability, and such that
Wp.P.Expt.s < Expt.s. A state such as s is a witness to failure.
But note that in practice there will be a number of counterexamples. Our technique is able to iden-
tify them all given any depth K of computation. Next we discuss how the strategy can be extended to
probabilistic loops reasoning.
3.1 Analysis of loops
We assume a loop of the form loop , while G do body od where G is a predicate over the program
state representing the loop guard; body is a probabilistic program consisting of a finite nondeterministic
choice over probabilistic updates. Our aim in this section is to generalise the technique of bounded model
checking to prove the safety assertion of the form
{e} loop {inv} . (9)
In the case that (9) does not hold there must be a failure tree (Def. 4) to witness that fact, together
with a set of failures to inductive invariance of inv. We shall be interested in the complementary problem,
in the case that the property does hold. For standard programs this can be established by exhaustively
searching the reachable states; any revisiting of a state terminates the search at that point, so that the
method is complete for finite state programs: either a counterexample is discovered or all reachable
states are visited, and each one checked for satisfaction of the (qualitative) safety property.
The situation is not quite so straightforward for probabilistic programs, and that is because the tech-
nique of exhaustive search does not generalise immediately to quantitative safety properties. However
via inductive invariants it does. Consider the program which repeatedly sets a variable x uniformly in the
set {0,1,2} after the initialisation x := 1, and terminates whenever x is set to 2. In this case we might
like to verify the safety property that x ∈ {1,2} with probability at least 1/2. Expressed as an assertion,
it becomes
{1/2} x := 1;while (x = 1) do x:=0 1/3⊕ (x:=1 1/2⊕ x:=2) od {post} , (10)
where post , {lift(x ∈ {1,2})}. A quantitative inductive invariant establishing that fact is given by
x/2, expressing the probability that the safety property is always satisfied at that state. (When x is 2 that
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probability is 1, when x is 1, it is 1/2 and when x is 0 it is 0.) In fact the property (10) is equivalently
formulated by setting post , x/2, which can be seen as a strengthening of {lift(x ∈ {1,2})}.
Since the triple (10) does indeed hold, no failure trees exist; more generally, in standard model check-
ing and for finite state spaces such a failure to establish the presence of a failure tree can be converted
to a proof that the property holds (provided all reachable states are examined). For probabilistic systems
however, it is not clear when to terminate a state exploration, since Exp.[[bodyKℵ]].x/2 steadily approaches
1/2 from above (where here body is taken to be the guarded loop body of (10)). However we can recover
the termination property even for probabilistic systems by looking at inductive invariants, as the next
lemma shows.
Lemma 1 Let P be a probabilistic program operating over a finite state space S; let s0 be the initial
state. If for all states s, reachable from s0 under executions via P, the inductive invariance property
Wp.P.inv.s ≥ inv.s holds, then Exp.[[PKℵ ]].inv ≥ inv.s0 for all K and schedules ℵ.
Proof 1 (Sketch) We use proof by induction on K.
When K = 1 we note that Exp.[[P1ℵ]].inv≥ inv.s0 is a consequence of the assumption since Exp.[[P1ℵ]].inv≥
Wp.P.inv.s0.
For the general step, we observe similarly that Exp.[[PK+1ℵ ]].inv ≥ Exp.[[PKℵ ]].(Wp.P.inv). The result
follows through monotonicity of the expectation operator.
Lem. 1 implies that we can use exhaustive search to verify quantitative safety properties using in-
ductive invariants and exhaustive state exploration. The search terminates once all reachable states have
been verified as satisfying the inductive property. In the case of (10), using x/2 for the invariant, each
of the three states satisfies the inductive property. Next we summarise a prototype tool framework for
locating and presenting counterexamples.
4 Automating counterexamples generation
YAGA [25] is a prototype suite of programs for inspecting safety specifications of abstract pB machines
and their refinements. Importantly, it allows a pB machine designer to explore experimentally the details
of system construction in order to ascertain the cause(s) of failure of a pB safety encoding as in (5).
YAGA inputs a pB machine or its refinement violating a specific safety property expressed in its
EXPECTATIONS clause, and generates its equivalent MDP representation in the PRISM language [14].
PRISM is a probabilistic model checker that permits pB models as MDPs in the tool framework and thus
can investigate critical expected values of random variables as “reward structures” — a part of PRISM’s
specification language. PRISM can then be used to explore the computation of Exp.[[PKℵ ]].Expt.s0 for
values of K ≥ 0, and thus (modulo computing resources) can determine values of K for which the ex-
pectations clause fails. If such a K is discovered, YAGA is able to extract the resultant failure tree as
an “extremal scheduler” that fails the inductivity test. The extremal scheduler is a transition probability
matrix which gives a description of the best (or worst-case) deterministic scheduler of the PRISM repre-
sentation of an abstract ‘faulty’ pB machine — i.e. one whose probability (or reward) of reaching a state
where our intended safety specification is violated is maximal (or minimal).
Finally, YAGA analyses the resultant extremal scheduler using algorithmic techniques set out in [24]
and generates ‘the most useful’ diagnostic information composed of finite execution traces as sequences
of operations and their state valuations leading from the initial state of the pB machine to a state where
the property is violated. Details of the underlying theory of YAGA, its algorithms and implementation
can be found elsewhere [25, 24]. In the next section we discuss practical details on how to use exhaustive
search of pB machines to verify compliance of inductivity for finite probabilistic models.
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IMPLEMENTATION contractionImp
REFINES contraction
SEES Bool Type, Int TYPE, Real TYPE
OPERATIONS
ans ←− contraction (NN) , VAR nn IN
nn := NN;ans := TRUE;
WHILE (nn > 2) DO
ans ←− merge(nn,ans);
nn := nn−1
VARIANT nn
INVARIANT nn ∈ N∧nn ≤ NN ∧2 ≤ nn∧ans ∈ BOOL ∧
expectation( f rac(2,nn× (nn−1))× liftans)
END;
END
.
Figure 3: A pB refinement of the contraction specification of the Mincut algorithm.
5 Case study one: min-cut
We discuss one of Hoang’s pB models [15]: a randomised solution to finding the “minimum cut” in an
undirected graph. The probabilistic algorithm is originally due to Karger [20]. We also report experi-
mental results after running our diagnostic tool.
Let an undirected graph be given by (N,E) where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges. The
graph is said to be disconnected if N is a disjoint union of two nonempty sets N0,N1 such that any edge
in E connects nodes in N0 or N1; a graph is connected if it is not disconnected. A cut in a connected
graph is a subset E ′ ⊆ E such that (N,E\E ′) is disconnected; a cut is minimal if there is no cut with
strictly smaller size. Cuts are useful in optimisation problems but are difficult to find. Karger’s algorithm
uses a randomisation technique which is not guaranteed to find the minimal cut, but only with some
probability. The idea of the algorithm is to use a “contraction” step, where first an edge e connecting two
nodes (n1,n2) is selected at random and then a new graph created from the old by “merging” n1 and n2
into a single node n12; edges in the merged graph are the same as in the original graph except for edges
that connected either n1 or n2. In that case if (n1,a), say was an edge in the original graph then (n12,a)
is an edge in the merged graph. We keep merging while the number of nodes is greater than 2. The
specification of the merge function for an initial number of nodes NN is such that
ans ←− merge(nn,aa) , nn ∈ NN∧aa ∈ BOOL | ans := (false ≤2/nn⊕ aa).
It expresses that with a probability of at most 2/nn, the minimum cut will be destroyed by the contrac-
tion step. Otherwise the minimum cut is guaranteed to be found. Contraction satisfies an interesting
combinatorial property which is that if the edge is chosen uniformly at random from the set of edges
then the merged graph has the same minimum cut as does the unmerged graph with probability at least
2/(NN(NN−1)). Although this probability can be small, it can be amplified by repeating the algorithm
to give a probability of assurance to within any specified threshold.
The pB implementation in Fig. 3 sets out part of the refinement step for the min-cut algorithm. The
refinement describes an iteration where the merge function is called to perform the contraction described
above. The result of a call to merge is that the number of nodes in the graph (given by the variable nn)
is diminished by 1 and either the original minimum cut is preserved (with probability mentioned above),
or it is not; the Boolean ans is used to indicate which of these possibilities has been selected.
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Figure 4: Graph comparing the probabilities to find a min-cut for the correct and incorrect implementa-
tions of the contraction specification of the mincut algorithm. The incorrect implementation is where we
have introduced a high probability in the left branch of the merge operation thus forcing the variable ans
to become false often.
******* Starting Error Reporting for Failure Traces located on step 2 *********
Sequence of operations leading to bad state ::>>>
[{INIT} (3,true), {Skip} (3,true)
Probability mass of failure trace is:>>>> 1
************ Finished Error Reporting***************
Figure 5: Diagnostics detailing a failure of the inductive invariance at the implementation step (for NN = 3) involving the
merge operation. Note that this is a counterexample since the execution of the merge operation will result in an endpoint
distribution which yields a decreased expectation (see Def.5). That is, there is a witness s (nn = 3, ans = true) such that
Wp.merge.2/(nn(nn− 1)).s = 1/12 < 2/(nn(nn− 1)).s = 1/3. Note that every trace component of the counterexample is
marked with a pair which denotes the state valuations of the program variables occurring in the EXPECTATIONS clause, in
this case (nn, ans).
Here we use the expectation(.) function to check that the expression liftans×2/(nn(nn−1)) simpli-
fies to an inductive property; that is, that the probability of preserving the minimum cut should always be
at least 2/(nn(nn−1)) while ans remains true, but is 0 if ans ever becomes false. Note that if this prop-
erty holds then we are able to deduce exactly that the overall probability that the original minimum cut
is preserved when the graph is merged to one of 2 nodes is the theoretically predicted 2/(NN(NN−1)).
Next we describe bounded model checking style experiments to analyse the refinement.
5.1 Experiments for min cut
5.1.1 Counterexample diagnostics
In our first experiment we introduce an error 3 in the design of the merge function. The graph depicted in
Fig. 4 shows a failure to preserve the expected probability threshold of the mincut algorithm. Specifically
the graph shows that the probability falls below 2/(NN(NN−1)). An examination of the resultant failure
tree produces the counterexample depicted in Fig. 5. It clearly reveals a problem ultimately leading to a
witness after executing the merge operation.
3We set the probability of choosing the left branch in the merge specification to be “at most” 3/4 so that the new specification
becomes ans := (false ≤3/4⊕ aa)
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PRISM model checking results for mincut algorithm for varying node sizes
NN States, transitions Probability to find a mincut Duration (secs)
10 72517, 128078 2.2222 E-1 18.046
50 412797, 732718 8.1633 E-4 131.363
100 797647, 1416518 2.0202 E-4 277.605
Table 1: Performance result of inductive invariance checking for mincut
5.1.2 Proof of correctness for small models
In the next experiment we fix the error in the merge function and attempt a verification of mincut for
specific (small) model sizes. In particular, we use YAGA to check that the EXPECTATIONS clause
satisfies the inductive property for all reachable states. The result is shown in Table 1. It depicts the
various sizes of the PRISM model relative to the number of nodes NN of interest of the original graph.
6 Probabilistic diagnostics of dependability
In this section we investigate how the use of probabilistic counterexamples can play a role in the analysis
of dependability, especially in compiling quantitative diagnostics related to specific “failure modes”.
We assume a probabilistic model of a critical system, and we shall use the notation and conventions
set up in Sec.3. In addition, we shall reserve the symbol F for a special designated state corresponding
to “complete failure”; in the case that a system completely fails (i.e. enters the F state) we shall posit
that no more actions are possible. In the design of dependable systems, one of the goals is to understand
what behaviours lead to complete failure, and how the design is able to cope overall with the situation
where partial failures occur. For example, the design of the system should be able to prevent complete
failure even if one or more components fail. Regrettably, some combinations of component failures will
eventually lead to complete failure — those combinations are usually referred to as failure modes. In such
cases, dependability analysis would seek to confirm that the relevant failure modes were very unlikely to
occur and also, to produce some estimate of the time to complete failure once the failure mode arose.
We first set out definitions of failure modes and related concepts relative to an MDP model. In the
definitions below we refer to P as an MDP, with F a designated state to indicate “complete failure”, such
that the annotation {F} P {F} holds. Let φ be a predicate over the state space and α a sequence of states
indicating an execution trace of P. We define the the path formula ⋄φ to be (⋄φ).α = true if and only if
there is some n≥ 0 such that α .n satisfies φ , corresponding to the usual definition of “eventuality” [13].
Our next definition identifies a failure mode: it is a predicate which, if ever satisfied, leads to failure
with probability 1. We formalise this as the conditional probability i.e. that F occurs given that the
failure mode occurs. We use the standard formulation for conditional probability: if µ is a distribution
over an event space, we write µ .A for the probability that event A occurs and µ .(A | B) for the probability
that event A occurs given that event B occurs. It is defined by the quotient µ .(A∧B)/µ .B.
Standard approaches for dependability analysis largely rely on the failure mode and effects analysis
or (FMEA) [18] for identifying a “critical set” — the minimal set of components whose simultaneous
failure constitutes a failure mode. Next we shall show how probabilistic model checking can be used to
generalize this procedure.
Definition 6 Let P be an MDP and let ℵ be a scheduler; we say that a predicate φ over the state space
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is a failure mode for ℵ if the probability that F occurs given that φ ever holds is 1:
[[PKℵ ]].s0.(⋄F | ⋄φ) = 1 ,
where we write Exp.[[PKℵ ]].s0.(⋄F | ⋄φ) as the conditional probability over traces such that F is reachable
from the initial state s0 given that φ previously occurred. We say that φ defines a critical set if φ is a
weakest predicate which is also a failure mode.
Given the assumption that once the system enters the state F , it can never leave it, Def. 6 consequently
identify states of the system which certainly lead to failure.
Once a critical set has been identified, we can use probabilistic analysis to give detailed quantitative
profiles, including the probability that it occurs, and estimates of the time to complete failure once it has
been entered. The probability that a critical set φ occurs for a scheduler ℵ is given by Exp.〈|Pℵ|〉.(⋄φ).
The next definition sets out the basic definition for measuring the time to failure — it is based on the
conditional probability measured at various depths of the execution tree.
Definition 7 Let P be an MDP, ℵ a scheduler and let K refer to the depth of the associated execution
tree. Furthermore let φ be a critical set. The probability that complete failure has occurred at depth K
given that φ has occurred is given by:
[[PKℵ ]].s0.(⋄F | ⋄φ) .
Thus even though a failure mode has been entered, the analysis can determine the approximate depth of
computation k ≤ K before complete failure occurs.
6.1 Instrumenting model checking with failure mode analysis
In this section we describe how the definitions above can be realised within a probabilistic model check-
ing environment in order to identify and analyse particular combinations of actions that lead to failure.4
6.1.1 Identification of failure modes
The first task is to interpret Def. 6 as a model checking problem: this relies on the calculation of condi-
tional probabilities which is not usually possible using standard techniques. However, adopting the more
general expectations approach — instrumented as reward structures of MDPs — we are able to compute
lower bounds on conditional probabilities after all.
Lemma 2 Let P be a pGCL program and ℵ a scheduler, X ,C are predicates over S, and λ is a real
value at least 0. Starting from an initial state s0, the following relationship holds.5
Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.(lift(C∧X)−λ×liftC)≥ 0 iff Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.(X |C)≥ λ .
Proof 2 Follows from linearity of the expectation operator and the definition of conditional probability
as Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.lift(C∧X)/Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.liftC provided that C has a non-zero probability of occurring.
4Note that YAGA computes probabilities over endpoints rather than over traces, thus we assume that failure modes can be
identified by entering a state which persists according to Def. 6. These will be deadlock states of the MDP being analysed.
5This expression may be generalised to allow for non-determinism: Exp.[[P]].s0.(lift(C∧X) − λ×liftC) ≥
0 iff [[Pℵ]].s0.(X | C) ≥ λ , for any scheduler ℵ. Note also that if C does not hold with a non-zero probability then this
definition assumes that the conditional probability is still defined and is maximal.
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Figure 6: An embedded control system.
From Lem. 2 we can see that (putting λ = 1) if Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.(lift(C∧X)− liftC) ≥ 0 then the
conditional probability Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.(X | C) = 1. On the other hand, we can verify the expression
Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.(lift(C∧X)− liftC)≥ 0 directly using YAGA’s output. Thus the following steps summarise
our proposed method for failure mode analysis.
(a) Use YAGA to identify a failure tree consisting of traces which terminate in F .
(b) From the failure tree identify candidate combinations of events C which correspond to traces termi-
nating in F .
(c) Using YAGA’s output, verify that the candidate combinations C are indeed failure modes by evalu-
ating the constraint Exp.[[Pℵ]].s0.(lift(C∧X)− liftC)≥ 0 i.e. after setting λ = 1.
(d) Compute expected times to failure for the identified failure modes.
In the next section we shall illustrate this technique on a case study of an embedded controller design.
7 Case study two: controller design
Here we show how YAGA can be used to provide important diagnostics feedback to a pB developer
summarising the failure the EXPECTATIONS clause in a pB machine refinement. We incorporate the
key dimensions of systems dependability — availability — the probability that a system resource(s) can
be assessed; reliability — the probability that a system meets its stated requirement; safety — expresses
that nothing bad happens.
The design in Fig. 6 is originally based on the work by Gu¨demann and Ortmeier [11]. It consists of
two redundant input sensors (S1 and S2) measuring some input signal (I). This signal is then processed
in an arithmetic unit to generate the required output signal (O). Two arithmetic units exist, a primary unit
(A1) and its backup unit (A2). A1 gets an input signal from both S1 and S2, and A2 only from one of
the two sensors. The sensors deliver a signal in finite intervals (but this requirement is not a key design
issue since we assume that signals will always be propagated). If A1 produces no output signal, then
a monitoring unit (M) switches to A2 for the generation of the output signal. A2 should only produce
outputs when it has been triggered by M.
An abstract description of the behaviour of the controller is captured in the specification of Fig. 7.
The reliability of the system is given by the real value rr; we encode this in the safety specification within
the expectation(.) function. State labels sg = 2 and sg = 3 denote signal success and failure respectively.
Otherwise state labels sg = 0 and sg = 1 respectively denote idle state and signal in transit.
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MACHINE SignalTracker (maxtime,s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp)
SEES Int TYPE, Real Type
CONSTRAINTS maxtime ∈ N ∧ s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp ∈ REAL ∧ s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp :∈ real(0)..real(1)
CONSTANTS rr
PROPERTIES rr ∈ REAL∧ rr ≥ real(0)∧ rr ≤ real(1)
OPERATIONS
sgout ←− sendsignal ,
PRE expectation(real(rr)) THEN
ANY sg WHERE
sg ≥ 0∧ sg ≤ 3∧expectation(lift(sg = 0∨ sg = 1)× real(rr)+ lift(sg = 2))
THEN
sgout := sg
END;
END;
END
.
Figure 7: Again we use the expectation(.) function to specify that states where sg = 0(or1) are worth the system
reliability rr; states where sg = 2 are worth 1 and states where sg = 3 are worth 0. This encoding is a safety
property for the sendsignal operation and must be preserved by any refinement of the abstract machine.
7.1 Refining the controller specification
Here we provide an implementation of the controller by refining the abstract specification in Fig. 7. We
also show how to adapt the standard B-style modelling of timing constraints [7, 6] to pB models. We
use the EXPECTATIONS clause of the form q⇛ p× lift(s 6= F) ⊔ liftsuccess, which captures the idea
that the probability of reaching the “success” state should exceed the given threshold q. Here p is a
parameter which could vary over the state, but which should initially be at least the value of q. Observe
that F denotes a state where signal is lost.
But before we do this, we assign individual availability to components of the controller and include
the information in the CONSTANTS clause of their abstract machine descriptions. The implementation
of the controller as well as the abstract descriptions of its components are in the Appendix. In the next
section, we show how to perform dependability analysis on the controller after setting all the components
availability to 95% (s1p = s2p = a1p = a2p = mp = 0.95). To do this, we use YAGA to provide an
equivalent MDP interpretation of the refinement in the PRISM language. This then permits experimental
analysis of the refinement and hence generation of system diagnostics to summarise the process.
7.2 Experiment 1: identification of critical sets
Step 1:
We set the parameters q, p := 1 in the expression q⇛ p× lift(s 6= F) ⊔ liftsuccess to identify all
failure traces for chosen values of the components availability. Fig. 8 lists three of the failure traces (out
of a total of 5) relevant to our discussion, resulting in a maximum probability of failure of 0.0025 after
the 6th execution time stamp i.e. maxtime = 6.
Step 2: From inspection of the above traces we notice that the failure of A1 and M enables us to identify
them as potential candidates for the construction of our critical set.
Step 3: We verify that their failure will indeed result in overall failure by examining the value of the
expectation lift(F ∧A1∧M)− lift(A1∧M).
For candidates such as A1 and M, we use the diagnostic traces to calculate the conditional probabili-
ties as in Def. 6. To do this we extract all the traces which result in F and then examine the variations of
the component failures in the traces to identify those which corresponded to a failure configuration.
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***** Starting Error Reporting for Failure Traces located on step 6 *****
Sequence of operations leading to bad state ::>>>
[{INIT} (1,0,0,0,0,0), {Sensor2Action} (1,0,1,0,0,0),
{PrimaryAction} (1,0,1,2,0,0), {MonitorAction} (1,0,1,2,0,2),
{Skip} (1,0,1,2,0,2), {Sensor1Action} (1,2,1,2,0,2), {SendSignal} (3,2,1,2,0,2)]
Probability mass of failure trace is:>>>> 0.00012
Sequence of operations leading to bad state ::>>>
[{INIT} (1,0,0,0,0,0), {Sensor2Action} (1,0,2,0,0,0),
{Sensor1Action} (1,1,2,0,0,0), {PrimaryAction} (1,1,2,2,0,0),
{MonitorAction} (1,1,2,2,0,2), {Skip} (1,1,2,2,0,2), {SendSignal} (3,1,2,2,0,2)]
Probability mass of failure trace is:>>>> 0.00012
Sequence of operations leading to bad state ::>>>
[{INIT} (1,0,0,0,0,0), {Sensor2Action} (1,0,1,0,0,0),
{PrimaryAction} (1,0,1,2,0,0), {MonitorAction} (1,0,1,2,0,2),
{Skip} (1,0,1,2,0,2), {Sensor1Action} (1,1,1,2,0,2), {SendSignal} (3,1,1,2,0,2)]
Probability mass of failure trace is:>>>> 0.00226
************ Finished Error Reporting ... ***************
Figure 8: Diagnostic feedback revealing single traces at endpoint probability distributions (after setting parameter
maxtime = 6) corresponding to the failure of the controller to deliver an output signal. Note that the state tuple in
this case is given by (sg, s1, s2, a1, a2,m).
The results were unsurprising and included for example, identifying that a simultaneous failure of the
primary unit A1 and the backup monitor M. On the other hand, once the pB modelling was completed, the
generation of the failure traces was automatic improving the confidence of full coverage. To illustrate this
point, a programming mistake was uncovered using this analysis where A1 was mistakenly programmed
to extract a correct reading only if it received signals from both sensors, rather than from at least 1.
7.3 Experiment 2: investigating time to failure
This experiment investigates the time to first occurrence of failure given a particular critical set. In
fact, the results show that members of the set of interest are indeed critical after verifying their overall
conditional probabilities of failure. In summary, for example, a failure tree corresponding to depth K = 6
yields distributions over endpoints traces whose components time to failure is shown in Table 2.
8 Related work
Traditional approaches for safety analysis via model exploration rely on qualitative assessment — ex-
ploring the causal relationship between system subcomponents to determine if some types of failure or
accident scenarios are feasible. This is the method largely employed in techniques like the Deductive
Cause Consequence Analysis (DCCA) [26], which provides a generalisation of the Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) [19]. Other Industrial methods that support this kind of analysis also include the Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [18] and the Hazard Operability Studies (HAZOP) [8]. But the efficiency
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Identifying critical components time to first failure
Critical Components Time step to first failure Maximum probability of failure
S1, S2 2 steps 2.5000 E-3
A1, M 3 steps 2.4938 E-3
A1, A2 4 steps 2.4938 E-3
A1, S2 3 steps 2.4938 E-3
Table 2: Maximum probabilities of failure are computed with respect to endpoint distributions of failure traces
(Fig. 8) and conditional probabilities are given by Def. 6.
of these techniques is largely dependent on the experience of their practitioners. Moreover, with prob-
abilistic systems, where an interplay of random probabilistic updates and nondeterminism characterise
system behaviours, such methods are not likely to scale especially with the dependability analysis of
industrial sized systems.
The use of probabilistic model-based analysis to explore dependability features in systems construc-
tion has recently become a topical issue [21, 10, 11, 3]. One way to achieve this is to use probabilistic
counterexamples [12, 4, 5] which can guarantee profiles refuting the desired property i.e. after visiting
the reachable states of the supposedly ‘finite’ probabilistic model.
What we have done here is to show how a similar investigation can be achieved for the refinement of
proof-based models by taking advantage of the state exploration facility offered by probabilistic model
checking. Our method is very precise since it can guarantee the goal of refinement — improving proba-
bilistic results. However, if this does not hold then we are able to provide exact diagnostics summarising
the failure provided that computation resources are not scarce.
9 Conclusion and future work
This paper has summarised an approach based on model exploration for the refinement of proof-based
probabilistic systems with respect to quantitative safety specifications in the pB language. Our method
can provide a pB designer with information necessary to make judgements relating to dependability
features of distributed probabilistic systems. We have shown how this can be done for probabilistic loops
hence generalising standard models.
Even though most of the failure analysis conjectured herein have been based on intuition, it should
be mentioned that a more interesting investigation would be to explore the use of constraint program-
ming techniques to support full coverage of probabilistic system models. This will enable us target larger
refinement frameworks as in [9] where probability is not currently being supported.
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Appendix
MACHINE Clock (maxtime)
CONSTRAINTS maxtime ∈ N
VARIABLES time,action
INVARIANT time ∈ N∧action ∈ N∧ time ≥ 0∧ time ≤ maxtime
INITIALISATION time,action := 0,0
OPERATIONS
timeout ←− initClock , BEGIN
action := 0 || timeout := 0
END;
timeout ←− clockAction(label) ,
PRE label ∈ N∧ time < maxtime THEN
BEGIN
action := label || time := time+1
END;
END;
timeout := time;
END
.
Figure 9: The specification of the discrete Clock is such that whenever an action due to the components or even
a Skip action fires, time is incremented while also marking the specific action. We use the action variable as a
marker to abstract the identification of the operations constituting the the diagnostic traces (See Fig. 8).
MACHINE Cmp (cp)
SEES Real TYPE
CONSTRAINTS cp ∈ REAL ∧ cp ≥ real(0)∧cp ≤ real(1)
OPERATIONS
cout ←− componentaction , PCHOICE cp OF
cout := 1
OR
cout := 2
END;
END
.
Figure 10: Here we model an abstract stateless machine for components with similar behaviours. Later on, we
shall use pB’s IMPORT clause to clone Sensor1, Sensor2, PrimaryUnit, Monitor and Backup Units via variable
renaming. The specification of the abstract Cmp machine is such that it can probabilistically either respond to a
signal request (cout = 1[active]) or it fails to do so (cout = 2[dead]) . The probability cp is a paremeter of the
machine and specifies the availability of the component.
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MACHINE SignalProcess(s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp)
CONSTRAINTS s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp ∈ REAL ∧ s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp :∈ real(0)..real(1)
INCLUDES Sensor1.Cmp(s1p), Sensor2.Cmp(s2p), PrimaryUnit.Cmp(a1p),
BackupUnit.Cmp(a2p), Monitor.Cmp(mp)
VARIABLES s1,s2,a1,a2,m
INVARIANT s1,s2,a1,a2,m ∈ N∧ s1,s2,a1,a2,m :: [0,2]
INITIALISATION s1,s2,a1,a2,m := 0
OPERATIONS
label ←− action ,
SELECT s1 = 0 THEN
s1 ←− Sensor1.componentaction || label := 1
WHEN s2 = 0 THEN
s2 ←− Sensor2.componentaction || label := 2
WHEN a1 = 0∧ s1 = 1 THEN
a1 ←− PrimaryUnit.componentaction || label := 3
WHEN a1 = 0∧ s2 = 1 THEN
a1 ←− PrimaryUnit.componentaction || label := 3
WHEN a1 = 2 THEN
m ←− Monitor.componentaction || label := 4
WHEN m = 1 THEN
a2 ←− BackupUnit.componentaction || label := 5
ELSE label := 6
s1out,s2out,a1out,a2out,mout ←− getState , BEGIN s1out,s2out,a1out,a2out,mout := s1,s2,a1,a2,m END;
END
.
Figure 11: The nondeterministic behaviour of the components is specified in this machine. An individual compo-
nent can probabilistically respond to a signal request by setting its state value to 1 or 2 denoting ‘active’ and ‘dead’
respectively, after leaving the initial state with value 0 (’idle’).
IMPLEMENTATION SignalTrackerI(maxtime,s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp)
REFINES SignalTracker
SEES Real TYPE, Int TYPE
IMPORTS SignalProcess(s1p,s2p,a1p,a2p,mp), Clock(maxtime)
OPERATIONS
sgout ←− sendsignal , VAR sg, s1, s2, a1, a2, m, t IN
t ← initClock;
WHILE (t ≤ maxtime) DO
act ←− action;t ← clockAction(act);
s1,s2,a1,a2,m ←− getState;
IF (a2 = 1)∧ (s2 = 1) THEN
sg := 2;
ELSIF (a1 = 1)∧ (s1 = 1) THEN
sg := 2;
ELSIF (a1 = 1)∧ (s2 = 1) THEN
sg := 2;
ELSE
sg := 3;
END;
sgout := sg;
INVARIANT s1,s2,a1,a2,m,t ∈ N ∧ s1,s2,a1,a2,m :: [1,2]∧ sg :: [0,3] ∧ t ≤ maxtime
EXPECTATIONS real(rr)⇛ (lift(sg = 0∨ sg = 1) ×real(rr) + lift(sg = 2)) × lift(t = maxtime)
END;
END
.
Figure 12: SignalTrackerI uses a WHILE-DO loop structure to model the passage of discrete time. The
PCHOICE operation provides implementation constructs of the abstract probabilistic branching statements with
respect to the availability of the controller components.
